Redeployment house

At the end of "Critically Queer," her account of the often unsubversive possibilities of drag as a result of their being framed within the limiting citationality of gender norms, Butler asks whether the drag documentary Paris is Burning might have a role to play in redeploying or reforming gender norms. In doing so, Butler veers (as is her habit) from the film's central topic--drag shows--and instead focuses on the alternate forms of domesticity depicted in the film "it is in the reformulation of  kinship, in particular, the redefining of the 'house' and its forms of collectivity, mothering, mopping, reading, and becoming of legendary, that the appropriation and redeployment of the categories of dominant culture enable the formation of kinship relations that function quite supportively as oppositional discourse" (622). In so doing, she imagines that the house might genuinely rework gender and sexual norms by acknowledging its "[implication] in the very relations of power it seeks to rival" while remaining "[irreducible] to those dominant forms" (623). I'm intrigued by the way Butler here imagines a refigured domesticity as a site of resistance, but also by the implication that domesticity operates itself by citing norms. This has implications, for the refigured domesticity of the small room and its alternates, as depicted by Lee in Native Speaker; the small room in the father's house is, in some sense, queered, and as such denatures the authorized small room of power.

Thackeray amongst men

Amongst men:

"Thackeray's bachelors created or resinscribed as a personality type one possible path of response to teh strangulation of homosexual panic, their basic strategy is easy enough to trace: a preference of atomized male individualism to the nuclear family (and a corresponding demonization of women, especially mothers); a garrulous and visible refusal of anything that could be interpreted as genital sexuality, toward objects male or female; a corresponding emphasis on the other senses; and a well-defended social facility that freights with a good deal of magnetism its proneness to parody and to unpredictable sadism" (Sedgwick 525).

An open sky of one's own

Rereading Woolf's A Room of One's Own for my theory seminar. First, it's a delightful essay: Woolf neatly mirrors abstract argument and embodied journey, walking her readers through the British Museum, where her quixotic distance from male influence takes shape in her caricatured doodle of Professor Von X and her catty disdain for the researcher next to her, even as she recognizes their unwarranted superiority over her and other women. But the lively part, for my purposes, lies with her discussion of money, and how it frees her to see an open sky instead of a statue. Male knowledge, here and elsewhere, is figured as ordered, organized by looming statues that warp and bend the space around them, creating their own aura of authority. It's facile, perhaps, but that's just what conspiracy theory makes visible: the urgent desire to be meaningful, to represent one's knowledge as essential firmament, when it is, in truth, as arbitrary as the strained logic of conspiracy. Woolf sets the statue in contrast to the unstriated open sky, a space without division or hierarchy. For all her urging about private room, this essay revels in open spaces, spaces where movement is unimpeded.

Boxwood grove as small room

In my chapter on Don DeLillo and Chang Rae Lee, I emphasize the small room as a site of masculine reinforcement, a site where gender hierarchies are ordered against the perceived disorder of postmodernity. I've written here, in the context of Roth's American Pastoral how the small room can be imbued with feminine energy as well; in Roth's work, Merry's terrorist cell becomes not, as it is for Oswald, a locus of masculine affirmation, but of a threatening, semiotic femininity, a femininity that utterly refuses patriarchy, within the designified realm of the counterculture's excesses.

Toni Morrison's Beloved contains yet another type of small room, one that indeed reinforces identity, but does so in the context of both the natural and the feminine. Lonely and isolated, pummeled by the "hurt of the world," Morrison's Denver takes refuges in a boxwood grove that functions as a room:

First a playroom (where the silence was softer), then a refuge (from her brothers' fright), soon the place became the point. In that bower, closed off from the hurt of the hurt world, Denver's imagination produced its own hunger and its own food, which she badly needed because loneliness wore her out. Wore her out. Veiled and protected by the live green walls, she felt ripe and clear, and salvation was as easy as a wish (35).

Morrison emphasizes the way the grove becomes a kind of Bachelardian anchor for Denver, keeping her identity intact in the face of the multiple forces that would destroy it, which would include the violent legacy of enslavement (which takes shape as her mother murdering her sister), as well as the rejection heaped on Denver and family by the community. So the grove, like the small room, serves to reinforce Denver against the storms raging around her. And yet, this room bears no connection to wider networks of power; Denver does not identify with imaginary women or men elsewhere.

Still, though, Morrison positions the grove as part of a wider state of dysfunction at work in post-murder, pre-reconciliation 124. In this sense, the grove serves both as a figure for isolation and an artificial differentiation from the enveloping domestic energies of the house. Moreover, Denver frames her subjectivity in terms of mystical forces, which offer something of the same kind of false-transcendence/connection proffered by conspiracy theory:

None of them knew the downright pleasure of enchantment, of not suspecting but knowing the things behind things. Her brothers had known, but it scared them. Grandma Baby knew, but it saddened her. None could appreciate the safety of ghost company. Even Sethe didn't love it. She just took it for granted--like a sudden change in the weather (45).

As it does for Oswald and others, "knowing the things behind things" offers a compensatory affirmation for Denver's character. Denver fills the void left by the loss of community and mother by both fleeing to small room and figuring herself as occupying a separate social realm from the rest of the community. Of course, Morrison is working in a much different tradition than DeLillo, Lee, or Roth, and yet I wonder what she's pointing toward with grove and ghost. What response to terror and paralysis is figured here? Might Morrison be pointing to a tendency toward mysticism and/or isolation in an African American context? This does beg the question of whether such rooms are too common to serve as tropes. And yet, they're each invested with a very particular energy which concerns individual and self.

The Psychologization of Everday Life

In a recent Critical Inquiry article, clinical psychologist Jan De Vos makes the case that "the pscyhologization of everyday life"--the widespread dissemination of psychology as a framework for interpreting--structures the understanding, critique, and solutions posed for Guantanamo and Abu Grahib. Rereading the infamous Stanford Prison Experiment and Milligram experiments, De Vos demonstrates how psychology itself served as the ultimate rationalizing fantasy for everyone involved in these experiments (Zimbardo explicitly recruited volunteers for a "psychological experiment"). If he's right that psychology itself is a widely applied function of biopolitics--that the belief that we are psychological creatures structures our submission to psychological discipline--then there's an uncanny reflexion between critics of Guantanamo and the torturers themselves; both see their efforts through a psychological framework, and both fantasize about their ability to view the Real of torture or human existence (Zimbardo claimed to have "laid bare" the human impulse to torture), even as what they really view is a product of psychology's own narrative fantasies. It's possible that this, too, is part of the disruptive work that Acker does in Empire of the Senseless and elsewhere: to lay bare the commonly circulating jouissances at work around torture and torture's observers.

Surveillance/social media/hiring

Reading Barbara Ehrenreich's Nickled and Dimed this week, in which she does a grittier version of Undercover Boss, albeit with some middle-class trappings of slumming intact. Ehrenreich is good at charting the psychological conditions of low-wage labor, in particular the real sense that, as she puts it, more and more Americans spend most of their day in a place that allows very little individual expression, and very little privacy. Ehrenreich describes, to give one glaring example, the indignities and inconveniences associated with mandatory drug testing, a procedure which, at least in her reading, seems designed to assert discipline over the employee more than it is to weed out actual substance abuse (though she does posit, at some point, that drug users might also be more likely to rebel against company cultures). So to be a low-wage worker, employed at, say, Wal-Mart, is to live in a kind half-Orwellian world, and the limitations around low income housing take care of the rest. What Ehrenreich describes is roughly biopower: the fruitless, relentless measuring of populations, with the net effect of keeping these populations managed. The data-intensification of recent years is something weirder, where the consuming self, the extension of the subject into the world, becomes immanently public and inextricable from the networks it engages, if it was ever otherwise.

Ehrenreich's book, published early last decade, of course has very little Internet in it; in fact, one wonders if any aspects of the Internet--say, the ability to apply for jobs online at the library--might actually alter the low-wage landscape, at least incrementally. But the potential for surveillance, of course, has only been amplified by the Internet era. From the start, I suppose, those Internet sites wanted a piece of us, and now they have it, handed over willingly. In one of those weird cultural synergies between private reading and public news, this week the AP reported that some employers--scattered prisons, some sheriff's departments, Sears, at least on some level--are requesting, and implicitly requiring, potential employees to give up their Facebook passwords. It strikes me that, like drug tests, this is going to hit low-wage workers the hardest, mostly because they're least equipped--financially, intellectually, and culturally--to resist. It's impossible, of course, to extend the current moment out into the future, and yet the contours of the coming society have begun to clarify: Something like Facebook may well become near-mandatory as a source of personal information, the way credit scores are beginning to operate: not just as a measure of ability to pay back, but of humanity cast more generally, something akin to "potential productivity"--a measure of the estimated future output of that most perfect of machines, the human body. I'm convinced, I suppose, by Shteyngart's imaginary in Super Sad True Love Story, in which smartphone, FBI file, social media profile, and shopping history converge.

The smart people are telling us, over and over: Facebook is what we were always warned about, but always imagined would be imposed--a permanent record. Of course, though, it's an idealized, performative self, but a self with real connections to real people, whose own backgrounds will likely enable more and more sophisticated profiling. How will anyone unionize when Wal-Mart essentially owns your data? I'm guessing that the data tracked by smartphones, DVRs, social media, rewards cards has only begun to be tapped, and most, all of us, are only dimly, faintly aware of the potential consequences, particularly as the world grows increasingly stratified, and therefore increasingly violent and crime-ridden.

Uneasily, conspiracy theory, subjectivity, social media

Last night, I switched my Facebook account over to their Timeline format. Suddenly, it all flashed before my eyes: my idealized life, the person I imagined myself to be, laid out in pictures and text. (Studies have been done about Facebook's notable ability to decrease happiness among its users, because users seldom post anything self-damning, and so it appears as though the whole world is problem-free. " Shteyngart in an interview: "I don’t think I’m any happier than I was before the iPhone and immersion in the Internet. I think I’m much more anxious and much more stressed out.") And I wanted more, I wanted to see more of who I was, what I'd done, what I'd consumed, what I'd liked, who I'd been with. I don't know how this will go away: the pleasure of seeing one's virtual self (and I do think "self" is appropriate, given its imaginary associations of wholeness) laid out before one, relieved, momentarily, of answering that terrible, tyrannical question: who am I, and why am I here? All of this resonates strongly with both old theories of postmodern subjectivity (a little of this, a little of that, all combined into a flat intertextual surface, per Jameson), and recent work on the culture of the Network Society, a society in which information constantly flows, and which morphs subjectivity into an anxious, do-I-rate self, as perfectly described by Gary Shteyngart, whose young Media workers commit suicide rather than live without their apparats and their attendant Facebook-amplified ratings. Both Jodi Dean (Blog Theory) and Tiziana Terranova (Network Culture) write about how the continual chatter of information produces selves that are, to some extent, functions of the network. Indeed, for Terranova, who is ambivalent about the political potential of Network Culture, individuals themselves are a regulatory function which reduces the potential for a multitude or mass:

The new place of the individual in the mode of immanent control is not as a model for the organization of the multitude, but as a tool that allows the overcoding and the ultimate containment of the productive power of flows. To the decoding of the mass into a network culture, to the dissolution of the individual into the productive powers of a multitude, corresponds an overcoding of the multitude onto the individual element understood as a unit of code modeled on the biological notion of gene (123)

The individual is here reduced to an Oedipal virus in the potentially productive code of flows. Why I care about this: I'm struck by the way Facebook has amplified a set of media and consumer cultures that make manifest the degree to which postmodern subjectivity is an amalgamation of consumer desires, recycled texts, quotations, and other dispersed texts that have little to do with an anachronistic individuality, and yet, the appeal of such individuality is exactly the filter through which the subjectivizing discourses of media and marketing work. Facebook is a physical manifestation of the set of flows that comprise the postmodern subject, the multiple and shifting discourses that uneasily course through the individual. That such a reflected, virtual self is subject to colonization by the corporations which feed Facebook's advertising revenue, that such flows are continually assembled and reassembled into marketing profiles, credit scores, fans, voters, consumers, and so on, that the very notion of a private, autonomous self which exist previous to the consumer energies that work upon it, doesn't really matter: if I believe it is me, if I believe that They act on my inmost desires, then my subjectivity is nevertheless activated, and my agency in the Network Society is effective.

In this framework, conspiracy theory serves as a set of particularly sticky subjectivizing discourses, discourses that promise, with a grim smile, all the imagined masculine agency of Yesteryear, as well as access to Their small rooms, Their sites of effectiveness, agency, solidity. Conspiracy discourses are different in degree, angularity, reach than sports, fan, fashion discourses, but not in kind. They just promise more. In this, they are not exclusively masculine, and yet their reactionary energy, their reliance on old models of self, functions as such.